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Key Takeaways
Min Aung Hlaing's foreign trips aim to secure legitimacy, yet his need to seek international loans, such as from Belarus, exposes the military junta's ongoing financial vulnerabilities.
The revolutionary forces continue to secure vital diplomatic representation, demonstrated by the Inter-Parliamentary Union retaining the CRPH as a partner.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is intensifying scrutiny on Myanmar-linked financial activities, demanding concrete anti-money laundering actions by February 2027 and pressuring the junta's financial flows.
ASEAN must measure progress through tangible results like halting civilian violence and delivering humanitarian aid, rather than granting the junta political representation at high-level meetings.
Estimated Reading Time: ~ 5-6 minutes
As Min Aung Hlaing takes foreign trips to build legitimacy as president through a sham election after swapping his military uniform for civilian clothes, some observers have begun to question whether the international front of the Spring Revolution is in decline. His expanding relations, from engagements with neighbouring countries to ties with Russia and other nations, have also raised concerns that the international community is once again accepting the military junta.
This concern cannot be taken lightly. State-to-state engagements based on mutual interests can provide the military junta with political exit routes, economic assistance, and the capacity to sustain its oppression. However, concluding that the revolution's entire diplomatic front has been defeated based merely on travel itineraries and photo opportunities does not constitute a comprehensive assessment; a fuller view is needed before drawing that conclusion.
To analyse the situation rationally, the relevant question is not "Which countries were Min Aung Hlaing able to visit?", but rather, "What practical results were achieved from these trips?" Other pertinent questions include: "How much political legitimacy was actually secured through these visits?" "Has the military junta successfully usurped the representation of the people in international organisations?" and "Has the junta managed to overcome its budgetary, financial and economic limitations?"
Reports of the junta seeking loans from Belarus should also be viewed through this lens, eliciting questions about interest rates and whether these loans are taken on exorbitant terms. While the status and outcomes of these efforts require independent verification, any assessment of the military junta's financial needs and limitations must account for the fact that Min Aung Hlaing himself is being forced to seek financial assistance from abroad. It is also necessary to differentiate between requesting a loan, receiving a commitment, and actually securing the funds, as each stage has different implications.
In contrast, statements and reports indicate that revolutionary forces continue to maintain their international engagements. Since the formation of the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), initiatives such as international diplomatic introductions, visits to Japan, Australia, and Canada, relationship-building with regional countries, including ASEAN members, and diplomatic briefings are underway. Furthermore, foreign affairs activities are being coordinated and implemented to support the revolution without contradicting the core foreign policies of individual SCEF members.
In evaluating the outcomes of these operational efforts within a given timeframe, the primary focus must be on the following points:
The extent to which the foreign affairs sector has communicated the revolution's political and military objectives and results to the international community.
The extent to which the Myanmar public and the international community have come to trust and accept the shared political objective of establishing a federal democratic nation.
The extent to which outcomes in international relations have been translated into humanitarian assistance, public services, and institutional cooperation.
The Value of Maintaining Representation
The decision to retain the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) as a partner of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) at its 153rd Assembly is a major political achievement. This not merely preserves the role of representatives elected by the public, but also shows that people's representation cannot be replaced by a political programme manufactured by the military junta.
At the United Nations, discussions within the Third Committee, reports submitted by the Special Rapporteur and the Special Envoy, and the evidence-gathering and preservation efforts of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM)—despite having different mandates and objectives—ensure that the military junta's actions remain under international scrutiny. Although these processes should not be expected to produce immediate action, the value of keeping these accountability mechanisms active cannot be exaggerated.
Ensuring that the people's voice continues to be represented at the United Nations through Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, and defending his current representation, remains a primary duty of the revolution's foreign affairs sector. It is not advisable to celebrate prematurely before a formal decision is reached regarding this year's UN Credentials. However, it must be clearly understood that Min Aung Hlaing's overseas travels are in no way representative of the people of Myanmar.
Financial Flow Pressures
The statement issued on 30 October by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international anti-money laundering organisation, is crucial. Because the FATF has continued to demand greater scrutiny of financial activities linked to Myanmar, military junta-affiliated financial channels and intermediaries will find it increasingly difficult to use the international financial system and will face intensified scrutiny.
The FATF's warning that it will consider taking countermeasures if there is no significant progress on anti-money laundering actions by February 2027 emphasises the possibility of a further escalation of international pressure on the military junta. By continuing to highlight the illicit financial risks of money laundering and online scams, the FATF is demanding that the military junta demonstrate practical enforcement actions rather than issuing superficial announcements claiming to be resolving these issues.
The FATF's decision is not a financial sanction targeted exclusively at the Myanmar military junta. However, this decision will impose immense pressure on the junta's financial flows. While it should not be defined as a victory for the revolution's foreign affairs sector, it provides a chance to continue pushing for stronger enforcement and scrutiny of illicit financial networks.
At the same time, care must be taken to protect the public's lifelines from adverse effects of the FATF's decision. The FATF itself has emphasised that its measures should not obstruct humanitarian assistance, the functions of legitimate civil society organisations, or family remittances. Therefore, while the FATF's pressure must effectively target illicit financial networks, stakeholders have to also cooperate with the FATF to ensure it does not harm the general public.
ASEAN's Next Step
The upcoming ASEAN Summit will take place amidst the aforementioned political and financial pressures. If the ASEAN bloc wishes to uphold the integrity of its Five-Point Consensus, it must implement the agreement's provisions in practice.
Progress on the Five-Point Consensus cannot be measured by the number of meetings held with Min Aung Hlaing, the number of trips he has taken, or the promises he has made. It must be measured exclusively by tangible results, such as ending violent attacks on civilians, delivering humanitarian assistance to all those in need, and including all stakeholders in political dialogue. Demands for the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, U Win Myint, and all political prisoners must also be staunchly maintained.
If the military junta is granted political representation at high-level meetings again without such substantial progress, ASEAN's consensus will be rendered meaningless. If ASEAN genuinely intends to take an effective approach towards Myanmar's future, it must interact meaningfully with democratic and ethnic forces, such as the National Unity Government (NUG) and the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF).
The NUG's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representing the revolutionary side, must not remain complacent by maintaining current diplomatic representation at the UN and applying pressure on the junta. It is imperative to translate diplomatic achievements into practical assistance for the people, capacity building for relevant organisations, and reliable partnerships to advance federal democracy.
Rather than feeling disheartened by every trip Min Aung Hlaing manages to make, or celebrating the trips he cannot make, assess these events against the more extensive trajectory and strategic-level objectives of the Spring Revolution, and use that lens to judge the revolution's direction.
The vital questions are whether the military junta has secured legitimate public representation, and what foreign policy objectives the National Unity Government is pursuing internationally to thwart the junta's attempts to return to normalcy.
Continuing to exert pressure to ensure the international community does not recognise the faux government produced by the terrorist junta's sham election and sham parliament remains the main objective and an immense challenge for the revolution's foreign affairs department. Beyond this, the other established objectives are as follows:
To work with international justice systems to ensure accountability, responsibility, and justice for the military junta's human rights violations, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
To effectively sever the military junta's financial resources.
To ensure the unhindered and non-discriminatory flow of humanitarian assistance into territories controlled by revolutionary forces.
To raise international awareness of the public's struggles and ongoing political developments.
When measuring the performance of the foreign affairs sector, calculations must include not only bilateral relations but also the annual resolutions of global bodies, for example, the United Nations and its affiliated mechanisms, international parliaments, regional organisations like ASEAN, international trade unions, and international financial institutions. The final measure, however, is whether these efforts advance the revolution's political objectives in practice.
The foreign affairs sector will only become more effective when it is inextricably linked with domestic public strength, political solidarity, and administrative development. If the foreign policy objectives of the revolutionary period are indeed to sustain public representation, block the military junta's attempts to gain legitimacy, obstruct the junta's financial and monetary flows, and instigate economic sanctions, then an assessment must now be made—and recorded—as to what extent these objectives have actually been fulfilled.
